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CAN GOD BE HIDDEN 
AND EVIDENT AT THE SAME TIME? 
SOME KIERKEGAARDIAN REFLECTIONS 
C. Stephen Evans 
J. L. Schellenberg has argued that a loving God would make his reality evi-
dent to all who want to have a relation with God, but that God seems hidden 
to many such people. One response to this claim, suggested by Kierkegaard, 
is that God's reality is not really hidden to anyone except those who blind 
themselves to God's reality. This might seem to imply that all atheism is cul-
pable, but it does not, since some of Kierkegaard's claims imply that those 
who may think of themselves as atheists may actually have an awareness of 
God's reality. This does not, however, imply that having a propositional un-
derstanding of God is unimportant; "thin theism" may have little or no value, 
but the kind of understanding of God that comes from knowing God as God 
does have great worth. 
[W]ould it not have an almost madly comical effect to portray a man 
deluded into thinking that he could demonstrate that God exists-
and then have an atheist accept it by virtue of the other's demonstra-
tions. Both situations are equally fantastic, but just as no one has 
ever demonstrated it, so has there never been an atheist, even though 
there certainly have been many who have been unwilling to let what 
they know (that the god exists) get control over their minds.! 
Many people who only know Kierkegaard from textbooks might have 
difficulty recognizing that my opening quotation comes from the famous 
Danish philosopher. To be sure, the claim that no one has ever been able 
to demonstrate the existence of God certainly sounds like Kierkegaard. 
Many people know that Kierkegaard is a great opponent of proofs of 
God's existence, someone who went so far as to say that the person who 
first came up with the idea of proving God's existence was Judas Iscariot 
number two. However, the claim that there has never been a real athe-
Ist, only people unwilling to allow their knowledge of God to get "con-
trol over their minds" does not sound much like the thinker who is best 
known as the proponent of the "leap of faith." 
It is true that the passage in question comes from the "B" section of Ki-
erkegaard's Papirer, because it is a passage that Kierkegaard deleted from 
the final copy of Philosophical Fragments, so one might think that the thought 
in question is one that Kierkegaard decided not to endorse. However, it is 
plausible to see the deletion of the passage as a decision Kierkegaard made 
at the same time that he decided to remove his own name from this book 
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as author and attribute the work to the pseudonym Johannes Climacus. 
When looked at in this light, the decision to delete the passage may be due 
to the fact that it is too deeply reflective of Kierkegaard's own views to be 
attributed to a pseudonym, since it does not sufficiently reflect the ironical 
ambiguity that Climacus displays, especially in Philosophical Fragments. 
In any case, the passage is quite consistent with what Kierkegaard fre-
quently says about God's existence. Contrary to the portrayal of Kierkeg-
aard as one who despairs of any reason to believe in God but decides to 
believe anyway because he cannot endure the consequences, Kierkegaard 
actually displays little of the epistemological worries about belief in God 
so characteristic of Enlightenment philosophy. He rejects the idea of prov-
ing God's existence, not primarily because the proofs are bad, though he 
thinks they are less than conclusive, but because they make it appear that 
something (the existence of God) that should be certain for an individual is 
doubtful. For example, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript even Johannes 
Climacus is less coy and makes it clear that he sees no difficulty with the 
reality of God: 
For to demonstrate the existence (Tilveer) of one who is present (er til, 
exists) is the most shameless affront, since it is an attempt to make 
him ridiculous; ... How could it occur to one to demonstrate that 
he exists (er til), unless it is because one has first permitted oneself 
to ignore him; and now makes the matter still more crazy by dem-
onstrating his existence (Tilveerelse) before his very nose? A king's ex-
istence (Tilveerelse) or his presence (Tilstedeveerelse) generally has its 
own characteristic expression of subjection and submission; what if 
one in his sublime presence (Nzerveerelse) wanted to prove that he ex-
isted (var til)? Would one then prove it? No, one makes a fool of him, 
for his presence (Tilstedeveerelse) is demonstrated by an expression 
of submission ... and thus one also demonstrates God's existence 
(Tilveerelse) by worship-not by proofs. 2 
Rational apologetics thus plays into the hands of the skeptic by making 
it appear that the weakness of the arguments justifies the skepticism. Ki-
erkegaard's stance on the existence of God thus differs radically from his 
views about the God-in-time; it is with respect to the latter that the "leap" 
is required, and the popular conception of Kierkegaard's views about faith 
in God is probably due to conflating what he says about the incarnation 
with what he says about God's reality. 
I believe that some of Kierkegaard's views on how God can be known 
are quite relevant to the debate over the "hiddenness of God" that has 
been recently provoked by J. L. Schellenberg? To summarize the argu-
ment briefly, Schellenberg has argued that if there were a loving God, God 
would make his reality clear to all who wish to have a relation with him; 
reasonable, non-culpable unbelief would not occur. However, Schellen-
berg argues that such reasonable non-belief does occur and this gives us 
reason to doubt that a loving God exists. I think that reflection on these Ki-
erkegaardian themes provides an illuminating response to Schellenberg. 
Can one consistently hold that God's existence can be known, even 
known with a kind of certainty, while maintaining that one cannot logi-
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cally demonstrate the existence of God? The answer is surely yes. Alvin 
Plantinga, as is well-known, has defended the claim that belief in God 
can be properly basic, and even amount to knowledge, although the per-
son holding the belief may not be able to prove God's existence. On such 
a non-evidentialist view of religious knowledge, the lack of conclusive 
evidence for God's existence is clearly compatible with belief in God that 
is both confident and reasonable. I have argued that Kierkegaard's own 
view of these matters is remarkably close to Plantinga's, and if this con-
tention is right, then Kierkegaard certainly can consistently hold that one 
can know that God exists while being skeptical of all attempts to prove 
God's existence.4 
Suppose, however, that Kierkegaard is some kind of evidentialist about 
the existence of God. In what follows I shall assume for the sake of argu-
ment that he should be read in this way. Would it then be possible for 
him consistently to hold that one can know God's reality with some kind 
or certainty while rejecting the possibility of a conclusive demonstration 
of God's reality? I believe that this is surely possible. Kierkegaard might 
hold, for example, that there is evidence of some type, perhaps experi-
ential evidence, sufficient to ground a robust belief, while still holding 
that the evidence falls short of what one could legitimately call a proof 
or demonstration. 
Obviously, it all depends on what we mean by a proof. If one means by 
a "proof" or "demonstration" a sound deductive argument with premises 
that can be known with certainty to be true by everyone (or almost every-
one, "all sane, rational human knowers"), then one can easily see how evi-
dence that is insufficient to constitute a proof could nevertheless provide a 
person with some kind of certainty. Such evidence might fall short of proof 
in at least two different, not mutually exclusive ways. First, the argument 
from the evidence could be inductive and probabilistic in character, or an 
"argument to the best explanation" rather than being strictly deductive in 
character. The second possibility is that the evidence, whatever its charac-
ter and quality, might be such that not everyone could recognize it. This 
second possibility in turn breaks down into several sub-options, again not 
mutually exclusive: some people might simply not be able to recognize 
the evidential phenomena in question at all, some might recognize the 
evidential phenomena but not be able to recognize that the phenomena 
in question constituted evidence, and some might recognize the evidence 
but not adequately be able to appreciate the force of the evidence. 
If Kierkegaard is an evidentialist about belief in God, as I am here as-
suming, it is the second kind of possibility (in one form or another) that he 
seems to have in mind when he says that God's existence is in some sense 
evident even though one cannot prove God's existence. In other words, 
he claims that God's reality is or can be evident to human beings but not 
to anyone and everyone; to become aware of God a person must have or 
acquire a certain kind of spiritual sensitivity, must possess that quality or 
set of qualities that Kierkegaard calls "inwardness" or "subjectivity." For 
Kierkegaard there is indeed a sense in which God's reality is both evident 
and hidden -evident to those who have eyes to see or ears to hear, hidden 
to those who cannot see and hear. The following passage from Postscript is 
characteristic: "Nature, the totality of creation, is God's work, and yet God 
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is not there, but within the individual human being there is a possibility 
(he is spirit according to his possibility) that in inwardness is awakened to 
a God-relationship, and then it is possible to see God everywhere."s 
One might say that for Kierkegaard, who revels in paradoxes, God 
is both present and hidden in creation-present for the person who has 
been spiritually formed in the right way and hidden for those who lack 
such formation. However, hiddenness may not be precisely the right word 
here, since hiddenness seems to imply some kind of intentional choice on 
God's part to keep his reality from being manifest. Kierkegaard seems to 
think that this hiddenness of God is not the result of a decision on God's 
part, as if God simply decided to make some people but not others aware 
of himself, but rather reflects the nature of God, which dictates how God 
can and can't be known. God is not a physical object such as a pencil or a 
rock, and he cannot be observed simply by opening one's eyes. The idea 
that God is the kind of thing that could be observed in a "direct" or "im-
mediate" manner is described by Kierkegaard as "paganism." 
Why does not God reveal his presence in a direct and unmistakable 
manner to human beings? Could not God spell out the truth in lights in 
the sky or do some astounding miracles over major population centers? 
Surely he could do these things, but he could not really reveal himself by 
doing them. Kierkegaard thinks that if God did such things, God would 
not thereby be giving anyone any genuine insight into God's own nature, 
and thus such a communication would really be a deception. Kierkegaard 
describes a spiritually immature person, a party-goer who is also the "cap-
tain of the popinjay shooting club," who would take notice if God took the 
form of "a man who is twelve feet tall" or a "rare, enormously large green 
bird, with a red beak, that perched in a tree on the embankment and per-
haps even whistled in an unprecedented manner." If God were to humor 
the demands of such a spiritually immature person by taking the form of 
the giant or the bird, the person would be deceived, because though he 
might become aware of God if God revealed himself in such a manner, he 
would not be aware of God as God really is. 
This is surely what Kierkegaard means by saying that "God is a subject 
and hence [exists] only for subjectivity in inwardness."6 He does not mean, 
of course, that God literally comes into existence when a person becomes 
subjectively developed, though there are texts which, read in a literal and 
wooden way, might suggest that is the case.7 Rather, he is here speaking 
phenomenologically. When a human being is not spiritually attuned, God 
is not experienced as real, and in a sense God is not real for that person. 
Thus, if I am mired in evil, God takes a terrible vengeance: in such a situa-
tion "God does not exist for me at all, even though I pray.'" 
In such a case one might say that God's reality is hidden from me, but it 
would be truer to say that I have blinded myself to the reality of God. From 
Kierkegaard's perspective, the knowledge of God is necessarily linked 
with spiritual development for a number of reasons that I will try briefly 
to explain. First of all, such a linkage for Kierkegaard supports a kind of 
spiritual egalitarianism. Kierkegaard consistently holds that it would be 
unfair if the knowledge of God was grounded in some kind of "differen-
tial quality" such as intelligence or philosophical acumen. Every person 
must be capable of achieving the kind of God-relationship that makes one 
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an authentic self, and it would be unjust if those who had greater intel-
ligence or education had an advantage. If the knowledge of God is rooted 
in such qualities as moral honesty about the human condition and humil-
ity, then there is equality because all humans are capable of this kind of 
personal development. 
One might object that rooting religious knowledge in such moral quali-
ties still does not lead to equality, since people differ in their capacities 
for moral development, both because of differences in temperament and 
also "moral luck" in being exposed to good role models, being challenged 
when they do wrong, etc. This is probably true. However, Kierkegaard 
could respond by holding that God takes all such factors into account in 
judging an individual. God and only God knows how much moral prog-
ress is actually possible for a given person at a given time, and the stan-
dards for an authentic relationship are adjusted to fit those differential ca-
pacities. However it remains true that the process of corning to know God 
more deeply and the process of moral development are linked together, 
and that all people have the ability to make progress towards achieving 
these goods. There is least equality in the sense that each person can make 
progress towards the ideal that God requires for that person. 
Secondly, Kierkegaard holds that linking the knowledge of God to per-
sonal transformation guarantees that the process whereby this knowledge 
is gained is one that will be personally upbuilding. He holds, at least with 
respect to moral and religious truth, that the ancient maxim that" only like 
knows like" (negatively reflected in the child's taunt, "It takes one to know 
one") is true. Linking the knowledge of God to the development of subjec-
tivity ensures that corning to know God will be a process whereby I grow 
and flourish as a person. Of course this "flourishing" must be measured in 
moral and spiritual terms; it is compatible with a person suffering a great 
deal in worldly terms. 
Finally, Kierkegaard believes that if genuine knowledge of God is 
linked to personal transformation, then we will not be tempted to think 
that what Paul Moser has called "thin theism," a mere propositional belief 
in God, has much value, a view that is supported by James 2:19, where 
James affirms that even the demons believe in God.9 For Kierkegaard God 
is fundamentally the Lord, and if one does not recognize God in such a 
way as to submit to his authority, then one does not really know God at all. 
A mere knowledge of the truth of the proposition that God exists has little 
value; such knowledge might even be harmful to an individual. 
It looks as if Kierkegaard is claiming that God is in fact evident for 
those who want to find him, and thus is denying the existence of what J. L. 
Schellenberg has called "inculpable doubt" or "reasonable non-belief."lo 
Certainly that is what the quotation at the beginning of this paper seems 
to imply. Such a position may appear quite unreasonable, even uncharita-
ble. Surely, among atheists we find at least some individuals who are fair-
minded, would be willing to believe in God if the evidence justified it, and 
perhaps even want to believe in God's reality. Isn't it a bit high-handed to 
charge that all such individuals have failed to develop themselves spiritu-
ally so as to make it possible for them to be aware of God's reality? 
Actually, a strong case has been made by Douglas Henry for denying 
the existence of reasonable, non-culpable non-belief. 11 Given the opacity of 
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the human heart and the possibility of self-deception, it is not easy to know 
whether or not people who reject God do so for good reasons. It certainly 
seems possible that Kierkegaard is right to hold that all atheism is what we 
might term "motivated" atheism. However, I do not think Kierkegaard's 
argument requires him to deny the existence of reasonable, non-culpable 
non-belief, and I want to explore a way in which he might concede that 
there are atheists whose atheism is more "innocent," so to speak. 
As I have already said, I think Kierkegaard would endorse Paul Mos-
er's argument that "thin theism" is of little religious value and may even 
be harmful. The flip side of that view is that the denial of thin theism may 
not be very harmful and might even be helpful to a person in some cir-
cumstances. In other words Kierkegaard simply does not think that hav-
ing the right propositional beliefs by itself has the same value that some 
theologians do. It may indeed be possible for a person to have the wrong 
propositional belief (i.e. that God does not exist) without this being the 
result of some spiritual flaw or defect. In fact, from Kierkegaard's point of 
view, such a person, who denies that God exists, may in reality be aware 
of God and have a relationship with God. That, at least, is what I take to 
be the point of the famous (or infamous) claim that "truth is subjectivity." 
The relevant passage, I think, is the well-known comparison Kierkeg-
aard draws between an orthodox believer and a pagan: 
If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity goes into God's 
house, the house of the true God, with knowledge of the true idea of 
God, and now prays, but prays in untruth; and if someone lives in an 
idolatrous land, but prays with Infinity's full passion, although his 
eyes rest on an image of an idol: where is there more truth? The one 
prays in truth to God, though his eyes rest on a idol; the other prays 
in untruth to the true God, and therefore worships an idol in truth. 12 
I think that it is clear that this passage does not imply any kind of relativ-
ism about propositional truth. It presupposes that one of the individuals 
has beliefs about God that are objectively true and the other has beliefs 
that are objectively false. The claim is that the pagan who has the false be-
liefs but "prays with the passion of infinity" in fact has a relation to God, 
while the person who has the objectively true beliefs about God does not. 
One might think that this passage has no relevance to the question of 
whether there is such a thing as reasonable, non-culpable atheism. After 
all, the pagan does believe in a God of sorts and even prays. Perhaps such 
an individual can have a relation to God in spite of his or her false propo-
sitional beliefs, but can one have a relation to God if one does not believe 
in the reality of any God at all? 
Surprisingly, I think that Kierkegaard's implied answer to this question 
is yes. It is possible for someone who does not assent to the proposition 
"God exists" to be aware of God's reality and even to have a relationship 
of sorts to God, in which the person hears God's voice and responds to 
that voice. There is a famous Biblical example of a person who hears God's 
voice without recognizing that it is God's voice. In I Samuel 3, we read 
that God calls to Samuel in the night, but Samuel does not at first recog-
nize God's voice, until he is instructed by Eli.13 Samuel is not of course an 
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atheist, but the point remains that a person can experience God without 
realizing that it is God whom they are experiencing, and this implies that 
some kind of awareness of God is compatible with atheism. 
How might an atheist have an encounter with God? For Kierkegaard, 
the answer lies in human moral experience. Kierkegaard believes very 
strongly that we humans encounter God in our moral lives, and of course 
many atheists live exemplary moral lives. Even in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, it is clear that the religious life for Kierkegaard, while not reduc-
ible to the ethical life, arises out of the ethicallife.14 However, if we turn 
from Postscript to some of Kierkegaard's non-pseudonymous writings, his 
conviction that to be a moral person is already to be aware of God's reality 
and have a relation to God becomes very clear. 
The link is expressed in various ways. One of the ways, well-illustrated 
in the first part of Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, known to many 
readers as Purity of Heart Is to Will 01le Thing from the Douglas Steere 
translation, is to identify God with the Good, as Plato and Robert Adams 
have done.1s Here Kierkegaard says that to be committed to the Good is 
to have a "relationship in which you as a single individual relate your-
self to yourself before God." 16 For Kierkegaard this relationship is just 
another word for conscience. Surely there are persons who are commit-
ted to the Good and who have a conscience, but who fail to believe the 
proposition that God exists. Kierkegaard thinks that such people are in 
fact aware of God's reality, though they don't realize that it is God whom 
they are aware of. If they are truly responsive to the voice of conscience 
and truly seek the Good, then they may in fact be in a situation analo-
gous to Kierkegaard's pagan: someone who has more truth in his or her 
life than another person who may assent to true propositions about God 
but who does not truly respond to God's call as that call manifests itself 
through conscience. 
Another way that Kierkegaard thinks about this relation between 
humans and God that is constitutive of the moral life is by understand-
ing moral obligations as divine commandsP In his book Works of Love 
Kierkegaard claims that the fundamental moral obligation humans have 
towards humans is the duty, captured in both the Jewish and Christian 
scriptures, to love our neighbors as ourselves. For him this duty is a di-
vine command and thus those who are aware of their obligation to love 
their neighbors, and who understand that their neighbors are not merely 
those who are their friends and family but that all humans are included 
within the scope of "neighbor," have a kind of awareness of God's reality. 
Presumably those who respond to God's voice and attempt to love their 
neighbors can even be said to enjoy a relation of sorts to God. Hence Ki-
erkegaard says that "the relationship between the individual and God, the 
God-relationship, is the conscience."ls 
It is also true that Kierkegaard says that in order to love the neighbor, 
one must have God as the "middle term." Thus, in a way traditional in 
both Judaism and Christianity, he holds that one can only love the neigh-
bor if one loves God, and thus the command to love the neighbor is linked 
to the greatest commandment of all, the commandment to love God. One 
might think that this implies that one must believe in God in order to love 
the neighbor. 
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There is a sense in which Kierkegaard does think this, but he does not 
think that it is so in the sense that one must have clear, explicit, proposi-
tional faith in God in order to love the neighbor. Rather, it is true in the 
sense that anyone who genuinely loves the neighbor must have something 
like an implicit love for God that is present as a component in that love 
for the neighbor. The reason why love of God is required in order to love 
the neighbor is that one must have a ground for love of the neighbor that 
is distinct from the neighbor's connection with the self. If I only love those 
who are my relatives, my friends, my kinsmen, and so on, then my love 
for the other still reflects a selfishness, because I am selecting those I love 
solely on the basis of their connection to me. To love my neighbor, I must 
love those who are truly "other"; in Kierkegaard's words, the neighbor is 
not "the other-I" but "the first yoU."19 The most adequate way of thinking 
about the neighbor according to Kierkegaard is to think of him or her as a 
person whom God has created and loves, and as the one whom God com-
mands me to love. I do not love the other on the basis of some "differential 
characteristic" but on the basis of what Kierkegaard calls "the common 
watermark," the "inner glory" that every human person possesses as a 
person whom God loves.2o 
However, Kierkegaard does not think that this conception of God must 
be clear or explicit. Rather, he acknowledges that the reality he terms 
"God" has been called "by thinkers" (doubtless Hegelians) "the idea." Ki-
erkegaard himself says this reality is in fact "the true, the good, or more 
accurately the God-relationship."21 It is therefore possible for someone to 
conceive of the neighbor as the neighbor without having an explicit belief 
in God. Rather than saying that someone must have propositional belief in 
God in order to love the neighbor, it is more correct to say that the person 
who truly loves the neighbor already has at least an implicit belief in God. 
Thus Kierkegaard says that "love is qualified as a matter of conscience 
only when either God or the neighbor is the middle term."22 I think he 
means by this that "God" and "the neighbor" as concepts mutually imply 
each other. No one can truly love God without loving the neighbor, as 
both the New Testament and Kierkegaard affirm. But it is equally true 
that the person who genuinely loves the neighbor in some way is already 
aware of God and has a love for God. 
Imagine then a change in Kierkegaard's comparison of the pagan and the 
hypocritical Christian in which we substitute for the pagan an atheist who 
is aware of God's reality and is responding to that reality without realizing 
this. Suppose that the atheist understands himself or herself as under an 
obligation to love all human beings as neighbors and is striving to realize 
that duty; and compare such an atheist with a person who professes cor-
rect propositional beliefs about God but lives in such a way as to indicate 
no concern whatsoever for human beings who have no natural connection 
to himself. I would argue that Kierkegaard would judge that the former in 
truth has some awareness of God's reality, even though he or she claims 
not to believe in God, while the latter in reality has no relation to God even 
though he or she espouses true propositional beliefs about God. 
This Kierkegaardian claim may appear to be at variance with traditional 
religious convictions. It is, however, supported by at least one important 
New Testament passage. In Matthew 25, Jesus describes a judgment in 
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which "all nations" will be separated into two groups, much as a shep-
herd would divide sheep from goats. The division of the nations is made 
according to how the people have responded to Christ. The righteous who 
are welcomed into the "kingdom" prepared for them since the creation of 
the world are those to whom Jesus says, "For I was hungry and you gave 
me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, 
I was a stranger and you invited me in, I needed clothes and you looked 
after me, I was in prison and you came to visit me." The wicked are de-
scribed as people who refused to receive Christ in this way. 
The interesting thing about the judgment is that both sets of people 
being judged are apparently surprised by the outcome. The righteous ap-
parently received Christ in these concrete ways without realizing that they 
were doing so, and the wicked apparently refused Christ in these concrete 
ways without realizing that they were doing so. How was it possible to 
act in this way towards Christ without realizing that they were doing so? 
1he answer in both cases is similar: what was done or not done "for the 
l'~ast of these" is actually being done for or not done for Christ. Jesus thus 
seems to teach that it is possible for someone who is caring for other peo-
ple not only to be in contact with Christ's reality but even to be responding 
graciously to that reality without realizing that this is truly a relation to 
Christ. On the other hand, someone who may assent to true propositional 
beliefs about Christ may fail to have a real relationship to Christ by failing 
to relate properly to other humans. 
This view also seems to be supported by Matthew 7: 21-23, where Jesus 
says that having the right propositional beliefs is insufficient for having a 
genuine relation to himself. "Not everyone who says to me, Lord, Lord, 
1Nill enter the kingdom of heaven, but only he who does the will of my 
father in heaven." Jesus adds a solemn warning that many who think of 
themselves as his followers are in for a rude surprise. To those "many" 
who will say to Jesus on the day of judgment that they had prophesied 
in his name and even done miracles, Jesus says bluntly that he will say to 
them, "I never knew you. Away from me, you evil-doers." 
Is then propositional belief of no value at all? Surely the answer is no, 
and Kierkegaard's view does not imply this. When he affirms that there is 
more truth in the life of the passionate pagan, or, as I have argued, in the 
neighbor-loving atheist, than in the life of the hypocritical propositional 
believer this does not imply that the pagan would not benefit from know-
ing more about the true God, or that the atheist would not benefit from 
knowing that it is God whom the atheist is serving. 
To see this we might make use of an analogy from sense perception. 
Suppose I am in a dark room and suddenly come in contact with a furry 
animal. The animal is in fact my dog, and thus I am aware of my dog 
through the sense of touch. However, it is clearly possible that I might not 
recognize my dog as my dog, or even as a dog. I might mistakenly think 
he is some other dog or even think he is some other kind of animal. It is 
true that I am aware of my dog, and also that this awareness is sufficient 
for me to gain some true information that could be useful in guiding my 
conduct. However, if I am aware of my dog as my dog, then I may learn 
much more from this perceptual awareness and what I learn may bear on 
the relationship I have to my dog. I will, for example, be more attuned to 
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particular features of the experience and more apt properly to understand 
the behavior of the animal in question. Things that I might have missed or 
misread if I did not know this was my dog will be gotten right. 
I think that something similar is true in the case of God as well. It is 
possible to be aware of God without being aware of God as God, and such 
awareness can be valuable. I may learn a good deal about God, and what 
I learn may be valuable for my life even if I cannot conceptualize what I 
learn as knowledge of God. However, if I have a richly developed under-
standing of God I have the ability to notice and learn about aspects of God 
that I might otherwise miss or misinterpret. Though propositional beliefs 
are not necessary for a relation of sorts to God and by themselves are in-
sufficient for a relation to God, this does not mean that such beliefs do not 
have value when they are allowed to inform the character of the believer 
as they are intended to do. Christianity teaches that it is by knowing about 
God's loving, redemptive actions, expressed most powerfully in the life, 
death, and resurrection of Jesus, that we see most clearly what love for the 
neighbor really is like. The New Testament says that "faith comes by hear-
ing" the good news about God's actions in Christ. There is great value in 
having the right propositional beliefs, then, so long as those beliefs do not 
function merely as propositional beliefs, but are allowed to transform the 
hearts of the one who is hearing the good news. 
However, it is probably misleading to place too much emphasis on hav-
ing true propositional beliefs. The person who hears God's voice and rec-
ognizes it as God's voice now does indeed have new propositional beliefs, 
but that occurs as part of the process whereby that individual comes to 
know God and to recognize God. What is important is not the proposi-
tional beliefs by themselves-knowing about God-but the close relation 
to God that knowing God and recognizing God makes possible. 
The Christian affirms that through a relationship to Christ, a relation-
ship that is far more than a set of propositional beliefs, we are offered 
powerful help in living in accordance with this love that we come to know 
in coming to know Christ. One of the problems we all face, whether we 
are theists or atheists, is that we find a gap between the moral ideals we 
want to realize and the reality of our moral achievements. The Christian 
believes that a person who comes to know the Biblical story of Jesus can 
have a deeper understanding of Jesus' identity and thus can enjoy a deep-
er, fuller relation with him, a relation that does not merely give us a better 
understanding of the moral task but begins to transform us so that we can 
fulfill that task. Such a relation presupposes certain propositional beliefs, 
though the beliefs by themselves are far from the relation. 
If one admits the value of propositional belief, as I have done, does this 
not bring back a version of Schellenberg'S worry that the hiddenness of 
God counts as strong evidence against God's reality? If we need proposi-
tional beliefs about God in order to have the best kind of relationship, and 
if such a relationship is a great good, then would not a good and loving 
God want everyone to have such propositional beliefs? I have suggested 
that God is not really hidden in the actual world, but rather that he is evi-
dent and hidden at the same time, since many are aware of God's reality 
without realizing that they are aware of that reality. One might describe 
such a world as one in which God is partially hidden, since at least some 
CAN GOD BE HIDDEN AND EVIDENT AT THE SAME TIME? 251 
people who are seeking to know God lack full, propositional knowledge 
about God. Why doesn't God make his reality so evident that everyone, 
or at least everyone who wishes sincerely to know God, will have full, 
explicit propositional belief in him? Why is God partially hidden? 
My answer to this question is a simple one: I do not know why God 
does not make his reality so obvious that everyone who wishes to know 
him has full, explicit propositional knowledge about God. So far as I can 
see my ignorance on this point is only troubling if the following proposi-
tion is true: "If God has a good reason for being partially hidden, then 
Evans would know that reason." I see no reason at all to think the above 
proposition is true, and therefore it seems rash to infer from my ignorance 
about God's reasons for arranging the world as he is done that God has no 
good reasons for the arrangement. 
Of course the fact that I do not know why God's reality is partially hid-
den does not mean that I cannot speculate about what possible reasons 
God might have. Perhaps, as Michael Murray and others have argued, 
God's hiddenness is designed to protect morally significant freedom. 23 Per-
haps, as Laura Garcia has argued, drawing on Pascal and St. John of the 
Cross, divine hiddenness is sometimes necessary for humans to achieve 
the kind of relationship and union with God that God desires. 24 Perhaps, 
as both William Wainwright, drawing on Jonathan Edwards, and Paul 
\10ser have argued, a mere natural knowledge of God would not be of 
any real value to us humans; the partial hiddenness of God may point us 
towards God's fuller revelation in Christ.25 Perhaps God's partial hidden-
ness is grounded in the ways God wishes human beings to live together in 
a community in which they are dependent on one another; maybe some 
do not have full propositional knowledge of God because others of us 
have poorly fulfilled our responsibility to share with our sisters and broth-
ers the insight that we enjoy. 
Perhaps, as Kierkegaard seems to suggest, the doubt and uncertainty 
that partial hiddenness may lead to for some individuals increases pas-
sion and conviction on the part of those persons. Lovers who have been 
temporarily separated often find their reunion more joyful and sweet than 
their experience of each other would be if they had never been apart; per-
haps humans who have agonized over the question of God will find their 
final union with God to be more powerful and satisfying than would have 
been possible otherwise. Perhaps the answers as to why God is partially 
hidden are different for different individuals. Doubtless there are many 
other possibilities we might consider, and of course the true reasons for 
God's partial hiddenness may be such that those reasons have never oc-
curred to us, and even if they did, they might be such that we would not 
be able to understand them in our current situation. 
In any case I do not think that God's partial hiddenness could constitute 
the same kind of epistemic problem that J. L. Schellenberg thinks God's 
hiddenness constitutes. For we must remember that even if there are some 
who do not understand and assent to some of the true propositions about 
God, this does not mean that such people do not know God. Some of them, 
hopefully many or even all of them -even those of us who are not univer-
salists are allowed to hope that all will be saved - may even be destined to 
blissful, eternal union with God. 
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Is there then no problem with the silence or hiddenness of God? I think 
that Nicholas Wolterstorff is quite right to say that there is a kind of divine 
silence that we find puzzling at times, at other times frustrating or even 
exasperating. 26 Those of us who are believers and who are honest often 
ask God questions-agonizing questions-because God does not seem to 
govern the universe as we might think he should. Horrible things happen, 
and we wonder why God did not intervene. Young lives full of promise 
are tragically cut short, and we ask why God allowed this to occur. For 
the most part, such questions receive no answer, or at least they do not 
receive the kind of answer we initially want to hear. We find this silence 
of God difficult to understand, though perhaps not nearly so difficult to 
understand as the events that prompted the questions in the first place. 
Schellenberg may be right to say that some of us also find it puzzling 
why God does not make his reality more evident than it is. However, the 
puzzlement we may feel about this strikes me as much less serious than 
the puzzlement we have about many other aspects of God's ways. 
However, I think that Wolterstorff is right to say that the silence of God 
is the silence of the God who has spoken and continues to speak. We may 
be puzzled and even disturbed about the evil in the world, and we may 
indeed wish that God would speak about such things more dearly. How-
ever, the divine silence does not have to lead to atheism, because it is only 
because we already have sufficient knowledge of God and God's character 
that we are prompted to ask these questions. Those of us who are Chris-
tians believe that the best answer we can receive for our questions is to 
be pointed to God on the cross. There we do not receive the intellectual 
answer we might like. However, we do receive assurance that the God 
who speaks to us loves us and shows that love by uniting himself to us in 
our suffering. 
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